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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Spirit Ridge Mineral Springs, LLC (hereafter "Spirit Ridge") appeals from the 
directed verdict in favor of Franklin County dismissing Spirit Ridge's Complaint asking for 
an abatement of nuisance and permanent injunction against the Franklin County gun range. 
Procedural History 
On August 25,2011, Spirit Ridge filed a Complaint against Franklin County. The 
Complaint included two claims: (1) Spirit Ridge is entitled to have the shooting range 
declared a nuisance and to have it abated; and (2) Spirit Ridge is entitled to a permanent 
injunction preventing Franklin County from using the shooting range or allowing others to 
use the shooting range. The case was heard by the Honorable Judge Mitchell W. Brown on 
February 25-26,2013 at the Franklin County Courthouse. 
Due to lack of evidence supporting such claims, at the conclusion of Spirit Ridge's 
case-in-chief, the Defendants moved for a directed verdict. The District Court granted the 
directed verdict finding that Spirit Ridge failed to show an ongoing and continuing nuisance 
that needed to be abated. On March 1,2013, the District Court entered Judgment, which 
dismissed Spirit Ridge's lawsuit in its entirety. 
Prevailing parties by virtue of the dismissal, on March 11, 2013, Franklin County 
brought a motion to recoup taxpayer dollars expended in its defense of the claims brought by 
Spirit Ridge. That Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees was denied in its entirety. 
On March 28,2013, Spirit Ridge filed its Notice of Appeal from the trial court's final 
order granting Franklin County's directed verdict. 
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Statement of Facts 
Franklin County owns and operates a gun range that is West and North of Preston, 
Franklin County, Idaho. (Tr. P. 205-206, LL 22-25, 1-2). The gun range was open 
to the public from daylight to dusk. (Tr. P. 211, LL 20-23). In 1978, while shooting was 
going on in the area well before that date, the area used for shooting officially became the gun 
range. (Tr. P. 359, LL 4-12). Franklin County had an individual who was considered the 
gun range manager and he "would supervise the people that were there to some extent, but he 
was not there at all hours during the range operation." (Tr. P. 212, LL 11-14). Some of the 
duties of the gun range manager were "general range upkeep and management. If it was trash 
he would take care of that. If the targets needed to be repaired he would do that. If there was 
someone at the range he would generally make sure that they were functioning in a safe 
manner." (Tr. P. 238, LL 6-10). Franklin County has placed "a succession of signs with 
rules and directions about the range and they are continually updated." (Tr. P. 256, LL 5-9). 
Spirit Ridge owns approximately 300 acres around the Franklin County gun range. (Tr. P. 9, 
LL 23-25). 
Spirit Ridge asserted that the Franklin County gun range was a nuisance and requested 
to have it abated. (Complaint P. 2, LL 11). Franklin County denied the allegations and the 
request for abatement of a nuisance and further disputed that there is a nuisance. (Tr. P. 4, LL 
12-16). Spirit Ridge first asserted nuisance was in 1999. (Tr. P. 26, LL 22). The last 
alleged nuisance that Spirit Ridge presented evidence or testimony about occurred in 2008. 
(Tr. P. 54, LL 10-11)(Tr. P 59, LL 21-22)(Tr. P 115, LL lO-13)(Tr. P 119, LL 21-23)(Tr. P 
125, LL 6-8). 
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II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Spirit Ridge's case based upon no 
evidence of an ongoing and continuous nuisance. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
The standard of review on appeal from a directed verdict requires the reviewing court 
to view all of the plaintiffs evidence as being true and to afford every inference favorable to 
the plaintiff that may legitimately be drawn from such evidence. Miller Constr. Co. v. 
Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187,697 P.2d 1201 (Ct. App. 1985). The reviewing court will uphold 
factual findings made by the district court in granting the motion for involuntary dismissal, so 
long as the findings are not "clearly erroneous"; however, it will review freely any statements 
o flaw. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consolo Hosps., 110 Idaho 349, 715 P.2d 1019 (Ct. App. 1986). 
However, a trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in 
favor of the judgment entered, in view ofthe trial court's role as trier of fact. Lindgren v. 
Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, 
Inc. V. Travelers Leasing Cort., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389,1391 (1990). It is the 
province of the district court in a bench trial to weigh the evidence and to judge the credibility 
ofthe witnesses. I.R.C.P. Rule 52(a); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 
979 (1997). The appellate court should not disturb a trial court's finding that is supported by 
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence. Circle C Ranch CO. V. Jayo, 104 
Idaho 353, 659 P.2d 107 (1983); Stoutv. Westover, 106 Idaho 533, 681 P.2d 1008 (1984). 
The appellate court will not weigh the evidence when reviewing a findings of fact; rather it 
inquires whether the finding is supported by substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence in the 
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record. If there is that support in the record, the findings by the trial court cannot be deemed 
clearly erroneous. Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1989). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Franklin County submits that the District Court was correct in granting a directed 
verdict against Spirit Ridge based upon the fact that no evidence was submitted to the court to 
show an ongoing and continuous nuisance. As the District Court recognized, and as argued 
below, Spirit Ridge did not allege any nuisance later than 2008. 
I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF LACK OF AN ONGOING AND 
CONTINUING NUISANCE. 
To constitute a nuisance, there must be a continuing offense or recurrent acts. State v. 
Sawtooth Men's Club, 59 Idaho 616, 85 P.2d 695, (1938); State v. Maguire, 31 Idaho 24, 169 
P. 175 (1917); United States v. Cohen, (D.C. Mo.) 268 F. 420, 422 (1920); Wynkoop v. City of 
Hagerstown, 159 MD. 194, 150 A. 447, 450 (1930); United States v. Butler, (D.C.) 278 F. 677 
(1922). 
A. Spirit Ridge asserted eight (8) different incidents of nuisance during the two 
(2) day court trial in this matter, none of which was later than 2008. 
1. First Alleged Incident 
Mr. James Ridge first testified that shortly after his purchase ofthe property in 1999, he 
was repairing fence, and he claims he heard and had skeet and shotgun pellets pelting him 
while he was doing this repair. (Tr. P. 22, LL 2-6). When questioned about whether he felt 
that whoever was shooting the skeet were using the range in the manner it was intended to be 
used, Mr. Ridge stated "No, they were not." (Tr. P. 97, LL 4). When asked whether this 
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conduct, in his opinion, would be either negligent or criminal on behalf of the individual 
shooting, he stated "If it's posted I would say yes." (Tr. P. 97 LL 25). 
During direct examination Mr. Ridge testified about the 1999 incident and its date of 
occurrence briefly: 
Q: Give us the best date you can as to when that first incident occurred and 
when you met with the county commissioners? 
A: It was probably during the summer of '99. You know, it's been a long 
time ago. I worked the property and fences and so on for a number of months 
before - and this was corning down a couple of times a month to begin with 
before I moved down here full time. It was probably within the first six 
months that I had owned the property that I saw there was a problem with 
people doing shooting and whatever they wanted on that area. 
(Tr. P. 26-27, LL 19-25, 1-4) (emphasis added). 
2. Second Alleged Incident 
Mr. Ridge next testified about an incident wherein he claims that while he was in 
Afton, Wyoming, he was speaking to his wife on the telephone he heard "booming" in the 
background. (Tr. P. 28, LL 9-10). When asked what he did in response, after he arrived back 
in Idaho, Mr. Ridge testified as follows: 
A: "I observed - nothing. I went up on the canal and walked and tried to find 
some shell casings or something. I could find no casings from all of the 
shooting that had been taking place." 
Q: Other than hearing it on the phone, did you observe any of the shooting at 
that time? 
A: I didn't observe any of the shooting in that instance, no. 
(Tr. P. 29, LL 2-9). 
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During cross-examination, Mr. Ridge finally admitted that he didn't know for certain 
what the "booming" noise he heard in the background, while on the phone in another state, was 
for certain. (Tr. P. 104-105, LL 15-25, 1-3) 
When questioned about when the second incident took place, Mr. Ridge was somewhat 
inconsistent with his testimony. In direct examination, Mr. Ridge testified this incident took 
place on December 23,2000 at about 9:00 in the morning. (Tr. P. 27, LL 9-12). Mr. Ridge 
confirmed this date and time on cross-examination. (Tr. P. 105, LL 18-21). Mr. Ridge later 
testified in fact this incident where he heard the "booming" over the telephone would have 
been a couple weeks prior to December 23,2000. (Tr. P. 104-105, LL 25, 1-3). Regardless 
of the exact date of this incident, there is no doubt based upon the testimony that this incident 
took place sometime in December of 2000. Id. 
3. Third Alleged Incident 
The next incident Mr. Ridge testified about was a situation where he claims two (2) 
men stepped over the gun range fence onto his property and started to fire at his wife and him 
and their residence. (Tr. P. 28, LL 9-14). When asked about whether he felt that whoever 
was allegedly shooting at he and his wife were using the range in the manner it was intended to 
be used, Mr. Ridge stated "I wouldn't think so." (Tr. P. 106, LL 13). When asked whether 
he felt this conduct was criminal conduct on behalf of the alleged shooters, he stated 
"Certainly." (Tr. P. 106, LL 20). Mr. Ridge was also asked whether these individuals were 
on the gun range or whether they were on his property, he stated "They seemed to be on my 
side of the fence." (Tr. P. 107, LL 18-19). 
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When questioned about when the third incident took place, Mr. Ridge stated it was 
December 23,2000 at 9:00 a.m. (Tr. P. 29, LL 19). As stated above, this was the time and 
date given about when the second incident took place but was then clarified in 
cross-examination. (Tr. P. 105-106, LL 4-25,1-3). 
4. Fourth Alleged Incident 
The next allegation Mr. Ridge says occurred was when a neighbor of his was shooting 
past his property. (Tr. P. 38, LL 11-20). Mr. Ridge stated the neighbor "went up on the gun 
range, was up on the berms, and shot to the north, clear across all of my property, across 
another piece of property, more of my property, and onto his that's probably two or three miles 
away, at a manhole mounted up on the can back .... " Id. Mr. Ridge stated he then confronted 
the individuals doing the shooting and worked it out with them on his own. (Tr. P. 38-39, LL 
24-25, 1-8). During this discussion, Mr. Ridge stated that he told them that their conduct 
amounted to criminal conduct. Id. On cross-examination, he also confirmed that if someone 
were to climb up on the berm and shoot from that location, it wouldn't be in the manner the 
range was designed for and negligent on the shooters behalf. (Tr. P. 108-110, LL 16-25, 1-25, 
1-8). 
When questioned about when this incident took place, Mr. Ridge stated it occurred 
"2007 or thereabout." (Tr. P. 38, LL 12-13). This was confirmed with him on 
cross-examination. (Tr. P. 107-108, LL 20-25, 1-3). 
5. Fifth Alleged Incident 
The next allegation that Mr. Ridge claims was when he states two (2) of his horses were 
shot and killed in 2008. (Tr. P. 54, LL 10-11). While there was ample testimony about the 
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two (2) horses that died, there certainly was no agreement regarding what the cause ofthe 
injuries to the horses was. On cross-examination, Mr. Ridge was asked whether he actually 
saw anybody shoot the horses in 2008, and he stated "No, I did not." (Tr. P. 123, LL 6-8). 
Mr. Ridge also had to concede on cross-examination that there was no way to show that the 
horses he claims to have been shot were shot from the gun range. (Tr. P. 144, LL 13-15). 
It was disputed whether these two (2) horses were killed via gunfire or whether they 
died via some other means. However, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to Spirit 
Ridge, that these horses were killed via gunfire, the fact remains that this specific incident still 
occurred in 2008. (Tr. P. 54, LL 10-11)(Tr. P 59, LL 21-22)(Tr. P 115, LL 10-13)(Tr. P 119, 
LL 21-23)(Tr. P 125, LL 6-8). 
6. Sixth Alleged Incident 
Spirit Ridge also had an individual named Deborah Fischer testify regarding her 
experiences while around the gun range. Ms. Fischer testified that in 2007 that she and Mr. 
Ridge were going around the property and repairing fences. (Tr. P. 155, LL 12-17). During 
that incident, she stated that she heard ricocheting but that none ofthe alleged ricochets hit near 
her. (Tr. P. 156, LL 1-8). Ms. Fischer confirmed that this alleged incident occurred in 2007 
on cross-examination. (Tr. P. 163, LL 1-4). There was a great deal oftestimony on 
cross-examination regarding what exactly she felt was coming at her and whether it was bullets 
or sand and gravel. (Tr. P. 163-166). When asked specifically if what she felt was coming 
over the top ofthe berm could have been sand and/or gravel, Ms. Fischer stated "yes." (Tr. P. 
164, LL 8-12). 
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7. Seventh Alleged Incident 
Ms. Fischer also testified about an incident in 2008, wherein somebody was allegedly 
shooting a shotgun at the range and pellets from the shotgun hit her truck and broke the 
windshield in several places. (Tr. P. 156, LL 15-25). Ms. Ridge testified that her and Mr. 
Ridge went to the range and spoke with "a kid" coming out of the range whom they confronted 
about the situation. (Tr. P. 157, LL 2-7). When asked whether this incident was reported to 
law enforcement so appropriate action could be taken, Ms. Fischer stated "No, not that time." 
(Tr. P. 171, LL 15-17). 
8. Eighth Alleged Incident 
The final individual that Spirit Ridge had testify was named Jim Hull. Mr. Hull 
testified that while working for Franklin County as a weed supervisor he was working in a 
grove oftrees to the north ofthe gun range when he heard a shot or two that "seemed to me like 
they came through the leaves of the trees. Up high, but through the leaves of the trees." (Tr. 
P. 197, LL 1-5). When asked how this made him feel, Mr. Hull stated he was concerned but 
felt like he was protected and wouldn't be harmed. (Tr. P. 198, LL 10-14). He was 
specifically asked whether he was concerned for his safety during the incident, he stated he 
was not. (Tr. P. 202, LL 4-7). 
When asked when he believed this incident took place, he stated "it has been five or six, 
seven years ago. Quite a while back." (Tr. P. 197, LL 23-24). Mr. Hull was asked on 
cross-examination ifhe had been in the area since that time, he confirmed that he had. (Tr. P. 
201, LL 15-18). When asked while he has been in the area whether he has had any incidents 
since that time, he advised "No." (Tr. P. 201, LL 5-8). 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED 'VITHIN THE BOUNDS OF I.R.C.P. 41(b) 
AND PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT UPON THE FACTS AND THE LAW THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
SHOW A RIGHT TO RELIEF. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) states: 
For Failure ofthe plaintiffto prosecute or to comply with these rules of any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against the defendant. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the 
defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and 
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. TIle court as trier of the 
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may 
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make 
finding as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for 
failure to join under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
LR.C.P. Rule 4l(b) (emphasis added). 
This court should view all of the evidence of the plaintiff as being true and afford every 
inference favorable to the plaintiff that may legitimately may be drawn from such evidence. 
Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187,697 P.2d 1201 (Ct. App. 1985). While 
Franklin County certainly disputes the eight (8) alleged incidents from a factual standpoint and 
whether they were actually a nuisance, the fact remains that there is no dispute that the alleged 
dates ofthose incidents range from 1999 through 2008. 
This court should uphold factual finding made by the district court in granting the 
motion for involuntary dismissal, so long as the findings are not "clearly erroneous"; however 
it can review freely any statements oflaw. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Canso I. Hasps .. 110 Idaho 
349, 715 P.2d 1019 (Ct. App. 1986). The District Court in this case correctly determined that 
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Spirit Ridge asserted two (2) causes of action in this matter. First, Spirit Ridge asserted a 
nuisance and a request to abate the alleged nuisance. (Tr. P. 424, LL 11-15). Second, Spirit 
Ridge was seeking a pennanent injunction stopping Franklin County from operating the gun 
range at issue. (Tr. P. 424, LL 15-17). The district court also appropriately recognized that 
Spirit Ridge ultimately would bear the burden of proof with respect to each ofthose claims. 
(Tr. P. 424, LL 17-19). 
The district court found factually "that there has been no showing of any intentional, 
reckless, or negligent conduct with respect to any individual members of the community who 
have frequented the firing range since 2008." (Tr. P. 428, LL 2-5). The court further stated 
that "there has been no discussion, no testimony, regarding any intentional accident since 2008 
regarding these issues. (Tr. P. 428, LL 16-18). 
The trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in 
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Lindgren v. 
Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061,1064 (1997); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, 
Inc. v. Travelers LeaSing Cort., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). It is the 
province of the district court in a bench trial to weigh the evidence and to judge the credibility 
ofthe witnesses. LR.C.P. Rule 52(a); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 
979 (1997). The district court found with respect to the nuisance "that there has been 
absolutely no evidence of an ongoing problem with respect to individuals who are 
frequenting the gun range, the Franklin County gun range, violating the rules, violating the 
law, committing intentional negligent acts that have caused harm to Mr. Ridge, to Mr. Ridge's 
property, or to the quiet enjoyment of his property." (Tr. P. 429, LL 5-11) (emphasis added). 
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As such, the court found that as it related to the first cause of action, that Spirit Ridge asserted, 
the plaintiff failed to establish an ongoing nuisance that the district court needed to abate. (Tr. 
P. 429, LL 12-16). The court again stated regarding the first issue that it found "that the 
plaintiff has failed to establish that in February of2013 there is an ongoing and continuing 
nuisance being operated by Franklin County in way ofthe fire range." (Tr. P. 432,433, LL 
23-25, 1). 
With respect to Spirit Ridge's second cause of action requesting a permanent 
injunction, the district court stated that "based upon the fact that the court has found that the 
plaintiff has failed to establish a viable nuisance in this matter that needs to be abated or 
enjoined. Therefore, the court will grant a directed verdict as it relates to count two of the 
plaintiff s complaint in this matter, thereby dismissing this matter at the directed verdict stage 
ofthese proceedings." (Tr. P. 433, LL 6-16). 
The appellate court should not disturb a trial court's finding that is supported by 
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence. Circle C Ranch Co. v. Jayo, 104 
Idaho 353, 659 P.2d 107 (1983); Stout v. Westover, 106 Idaho 533, 681 P.2d 1008 (1984). 
The appellate court will not weigh the evidence when reviewing a findings of fact; rather it 
inquires whether the finding is supported by substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence in the 
record. If there is that support in the record, the findings by the trial court cannot be deemed 
clearly erroneous. Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1989). 
While Spirit Ridge asserts that "Mr. Ridge stated in the record that the improvements 
made up to 2008 were insufficient and between 2008 and the time ofthe trial 'probably seven 
time [he has] been on that north end and the west and the east of [the berms] and heard 
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ricochets. ,,, (Appellants BriefP. 34). Again, the appellate court is not supposed to weigh the 
evidence when reviewing a findings of fact; rather it inquires whether the finding is supported 
by substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence in the record. Ifthere is that support in the record, 
the findings by the trial court cannot be deemed clearly erroneous. Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 
Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1989). It is the duty ofthe district court in a bench trial to 
weigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. LR.C.P. Rule 52(a); 
Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). In this case, after weighing 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, the district court ruled that there isn't an 
ongoing and continuing nuisance that this court needs to abate with respect to Spirit Ridge's 
claims. (Tr. P. 429-433). 
Spirit Ridge also claims that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof in 
this case. (Appellants BriefP. 41). However, Spirit Ridge fails to understand that the burden 
of proof was on the plaintiff to prove an ongoing and continuing nuisance that required the 
relief sought. To constitute a nuisance there must be a continuing offense or recurrent acts. 
State v. Sawtooth Men's Club, 59 Idaho 616,85 P.2d 695, (1938); State v. Maguire, 31 Idaho 
24, 169P.175 (1917); UnitedStatesv. Cohen, (D.C. Mo.) 268 F.420,422 (1920); Wynkoopv. 
City of Hagerstown, 159 MD. 194, 150 A. 447, 450 (1930); United States v. Butler, (D.C.) 278 
F.677(1922). As such, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove a nuisance exists that 
needs to be abated. The district court specifically ruled "that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish that in February of2013 there is an ongoing and continuing nuisance being operated 
by Franklin County in way ofthe fire range." (Tr. P. 432,433, LL 23-25, 1). 
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V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Should Franklin County prevail on appeal, they request attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, LA.R. 41, and or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
The Court explained in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237 (2003), 
the Court will award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 only where the entire appeal was 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Because the series is 
disjunctive, attorney fees can be awarded where the appeal is without foundation or 
unreasonable or frivolously filed. 
Spirit Ridge appeals the District Court's dismissal. Continuing this case on appeal 
suggests that Spirit Ridge has failed to take into account that they suffered dismissal via 
directed verdict because the District Court clearly and unequivocally ruled that they had not 
shown an ongoing and continuing nuisance. It was/is disputed whether the alleged incidents 
equated to a nuisance, the fact remains that each and every incident occurred no later than 
2008. Logic dictates that the appeal can have no more basis than the dismissed case below. 
The Appellant's Brief does not forward any legitimate argument of reversible error by the 
District Court. Continuing this litigation on appeal after the District Court explained the basis 
of its reasoning is unreasonable. The appeal can thus be seen as frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Consistent with Idaho law, the District Court properly concluded that the Plaintiff had 
not shown an ongoing and continuing nuisance that required abatement and dismissed the case 
via directed verdict. Spirit Ridge offers no argument that would require a different outcome, 
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but rather rehashes whether the incidents complained of were a nuisance. Regardless of 
whether they were a nuisance or not, the fact remains that the last allegation that was supported 
by credible testimony occurred in 2008. The District Court clearly ruled that the record was a 
complete dearth with respect to an ongoing nuisance. Unless this Court wishes to follow what 
is being urged upon it by Spirit Ridge and substitute its own findings of fact and judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, the decision should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Franklin County therefore respectfully requests that this Court uphold the District 
Court's dismissal of Spirit Ridge's entire case and grant the Defendants their costs and fees on 
appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d ~-ll.,. day of August, 2013. 
FRANKLIN COUNTY 
VIC A PEARSON 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF was served on the d'6.Jlday of August, 2013, 
On: By: 
BLAKE S. ATKIN 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
837 SOUTH 500 WEST, SUITE 200 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
CLERK OF THE COURT'S OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE,ID 83720-0101 
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